Journal of Legislation
Volume 5 | Issue 1

Article 2

1-1-1978

The Politics of Federal Reorganization: A
Legislator's Perspective
John Brademas

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg
Recommended Citation
Brademas, John (1978) "The Politics of Federal Reorganization: A Legislator's Perspective," Journal of Legislation: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article
2.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol5/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journal of Legislation at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Legislation by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

THE POLITICS OF

FEDERAL REORGANIZATION:
A LEGISLATOR'S PERSPECTIVE
John Brademas *
Reorganization of the federal executive is not a phenomenon that occurs
in isolation; it takes place in and through a set of extraordinarily complex
institutions and processes.
Clearly, executive branch reorganization is a matter of high priority and
importance, both for Congress and the President. As President Carter said
when he signed the Reorganization Act of 19771 into law on April 6, 1977:
I think of all the campaign speeches that I made throughout the Nation, the
most consistent commitment that was made to the American people was that
I would move as quickly as possible to improve the efficiency and the
effectiveness and the sensitivity of the Federal Government bureaucracy in
dealing with the needs of the American people. 2
"[Mly administration," the President continued, "is determined to reorganize
3
and streamline the executive branch of our Government."
As part of this effort, the President created a Reorganization Project within
the Office of Management and Budget, and assigned it an ambitious agenda.
The objectives stipulated for the reorganization of the executive branch were
specified as follows:
Ensuring maximum efficiency and economy in Government;
Promoting more effective planning and coordination of government activities;
Simplifying Government;
Making Government more responsive;
Opening Government proceedings;
Reducing fragmentation, overlap, and unnecessary paperwork;
Developing incentives for increased productivity;
Giving managers the authority necessary to do the job and then holding them
accountable;
Increasing the predictability and consistency of Government;
Improving the relationships between Federal, State and local governments to
ensure a balanced partnership and better coordination. 4
*U.S. Representative in Congress (D., Indiana). Majority Whip, U.S. House of Representatives. Chairman,
Subcommittee on Select Education, Committee on Education and Labor. B.A., Harvard University, 1949;
Rhodes Scholar; D.Phil. [Oxon.], 1954.
This article is based on an address by the author, "Federal Reorganization and Its Likely Impact on
State and Local Government," delivered on September 20, 1977, at a Conference on Government Reorganization
sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in association with the Center for the
Study of Federalism.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Pub. L. No. 95-17,
Stat.
(1977).
Reorganization Act oT-1977: The President's Remarks at the Bill Signing Ceremony, 13 Weekly Comp.
of Pres. Doc. 493 (Apr. 6, 1977).
Statement by the President on Signing S. 626 Into Law, 13 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 493, 494
(Apr. 6, 1977).
"President's Reorganization Project," 13 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 494 (Apr. 6, 1977)..
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It is not surprising that President Carter, as the first former governor to
become President since Franklin D. Roosevelt, has emphasized improving
relations between the federal government and state and local governments.
Moreover, Mr. Carter served as governor of Georgia during a period of rapid
expansion of federal programs that have considerable impact on state and local
governments, and a hallmark of his administration there was a reorganization
of the executive branch of the state government.
THE CONTEXT OF REORGANIZATION
In analyzing the politics of reorganization, we must examine the structure
of the political system within which that reorganization is to take place.
The American Political System
Three elements fundamental to the context of our consideration of the
impact of reorganization are the separation of powers within our federal system,
decentralized political parties and a federal system in constant flux.
The American Constitution, and the political system of which it is a part,
are unique, and they are complex. They are characterized by separated
institutions sharing powers. Although responsive to different if at times
overlapping constituencies, the President, Congress and the courts all have real
influence in the decision-making processes of our government.
For example, reorganization focuses on decisions taken by the executive,
yet actions of Congress can produce policy despite and over executive branch
objections.
Congress has itself initiated reorganizations of the executive. It was Congress
that, in opposition to the views of the Nixon administration, mandated the
location in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of both the
Rehabilitation Services Administration and the Administration on Aging.
In addition to the separation of powers, our system of governance is made
more complex by our decentralized political parties. Members of the House
and Senate, like governors and mayors, are not beholden to the President or
to a national party organization. Our national parties are not highly disciplined
structures but rather loose coalitions linked by ties of history, ideology,
self-interest and our electoral mechanism. American parties are not consistently
effective instruments for setting national policies in clear directions.
A third element that enriches the complexity of our governing processes
is our federal system. For the Founding Fathers, the federal system embraced
a national government exercising a limited number of specific powers and state
governments retaining all those powers not delegated to the national government.
It is a truism that our Constitution has proved flexible enough to accommodate
the changing needs of the nation, and that we now have a system in which
the national and state governments share many powers rather than there being
two rigidly confined and exclusive spheres of authority.
The late Morton Grodzins aptly characterized our federal system as a
"marble cake." Said Grodzins, "Whenever you slice through it, you reveal an
inseparable mixture of differently colored ingredients. There is no neat horizontal
stratification . . . . So it is with Federal, state and local responsibilities in
the chaotic marble cake of American government." 5
5.

Morton Grodzins, "Centralization and Decentralization in the American Federal System," in
Nation of States: Essays on the American Federal System 3, 4 (Robert A. Goldwin ed. 1961).
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The reality is still more complex than Grodzins' analogy. We do not today
enjoy even the simplicity of a federal-state-local arrangement. There are school
boards, metropolitan governments, regional compacts and a variety of other
special authorities.
And although there may be some activities in which there is a clear
delineation of powers-national defense, for example, at one end of the spectrum,
and fire protection at the other-the marbled layer cake metaphor is useful
to describe the overlapping of authority in other areas such as education,
pollution control and economic development.
Reorganization: One Among Many Federal Policies
Yet I must compound further the complexity of the context by reminding
you that federal executive organization is only one among many federal policies
that affect what state and local governments do.
Statutory formulas for distribution of federal grants, revenue sharing and
overall federal postures on urban, suburban and rural problems have a direct
and significant impact on state and local governments.
Moreover, many general policies of the federal government, policies not
adopted with specific state and local concerns in mind, can nonetheless powerfully
influence them. I cite only two instances of what I mean: The President's
commitments to a balanced budget and to zero-based budgeting.
It must be obvious, too, that political developments at the national level
such as change, after years of divided government, in the partisan pattern of
control of the federal executive and legislative branches to control by the same
party can have significant impact on the relationships between states and
localities and the federal government.
Reorganization and the Broader Environment
There is a third kind of factor which can shape the impact of federal
reorganization: the entire range of non-governmental social, economic and
human variables. The rates of inflation and of the growth of the GNP, the
level of unemployment, the birth rate, the supply and price of OPEC oil-these
are all elements over which the federal government is not sovereign but that
nonetheless have a profound impact on the entire layer cake of federalism.
Finally, we cannot forget that in discussing government generally and
reorganization specifically, we must take into account human behavior and
personal idiosyncrasy. Members of the same Cabinet in an administration
committed to executive reorganization may seek to meet that commitment in
radically different ways.
Thus, it is clear that reorganization is only one among many federal policies
that shape relations with the American people, the states and localities, and
these relations are significantly molded too by factors outside or beyond the
control of government. To reiterate, executive reorganization does not occur
in an isolated context
You will not, in view of my analysis so far, be surprised at my admonition
that we must not rush to attribute direct cause and effect correlation between
federal executive reorganization and the government's efficiency or effectiveness,
or between reorganization and the federal government's impact on states and
localities.
In like fashion and without deprecating the potential significance of
reorganization, I would warn against any easy assumption that the problems
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of states and cities can be cured by restructuring of the federal executive.
For all these reasons, one cannot predict with confidence the consequences
of any given reorganization scheme. The title of a 1966 book on the subject
makes my point: It All Depends.6
A FEDERAL LEGISLATOR'S PERSPECTIVE
Having attempted to place my analysis in this broader context, I should
like now to address more directly the question of the impact of federal executive
reorganization on state and local governments. I shall here interject that I
believe that most of my observations apply as well to the impact of federal
reorganization on non-governmental institutions that are also affected by federal
programs, such as colleges and universities, hospitals and social service agencies.
As you know, I write not as part of the executive branch but as a legislator
and more particularly still as a Member of Congress who chairs a subcommittee
with jurisdiction over federal programs for education of the handicapped,
vocational rehabilitation, older Americans, arts and humanities, child abuse
prevention and treatment, libraries, educational research, alcohol and drug
abuse education, and environmental education. I also serve on the subcommittee
with responsibility for federal student assistance and a variety of programs
assisting colleges and universities.
I comment then as one of those who helped write a number of programs
which have given rise to the new relationships in the federal system.
REORGANIZATION FOR "GOOD GOVERNMENT"
The announced objective of federal reorganization is to improve the
performance of government. Reorganization, we are told, will make government
more efficient, economical and effective. It will produce greater simplicity,
uniformity, consistency and predictability. It will make government more open
and responsive to public concerns. It will enable federal executives to plan
more intelligently and to exercise better control over their programs. In short,
reorganization promises to "make government work" and to produce "good
government." These objectives for reorganization are succinctly set forth in
the statement of purpose of the President's Reorganization Project, cited earlier.
It is at this point that I feel constrained to voice a degree of skepticism
about the pretensions of the backers of executive reorganization to achieve
this litany of "good government" goals.
Let me express some of my reservations.
Mechanistic Analogies
First, in pressing for reorganization, we must be aware of seduction by
simple mechanistic analogies.
If we see government as a machine, we have the comfort of believing that
with relative ease we can rearrange the gears, levers and rods and can
understand, control and predict the results of our handiwork. But government
is not a tinker toy or erector set or even a computer. We should seek our
analogies not in the precise worlds of mechanics or physics but in the organic
one of biology; reorganization is less like changing a carburetor than performing
a heart transplant.

6.

Harvey Sherman, It All Depends: A Pragmatic Approach to Organization (1966).
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The Inevitability of Trade-offs
A second reason we should be skeptical of accepting at face value the
promises asserted for reorganization plans is that reorganization involves
inevitable trade-offs. All of the objectives of reorganization cannot be achieved
simultaneously. Some of these goals point in opposite directions and are
incompatible with others. For example, grouping related programs in order to
eliminate overlap and duplication clearly implies a centralization of authority.
On the other hand, making government more open and responsive to citizens
suggests decentralization.
There is another trade-off in reorganization. Although it is supposed to
make government perform better in the long run, in the short run reorganization
often means disruption of established relations. On-going delivery systems and
familiar forms and phone numbers cannot be replaced without a measure of
delay and confusion. Anticipated improvements must be weighed against such
losses.
Some reorganizations may, indeed, prove capable of producing the results
represented for them. Federal programs may be able to help state and local
governments operate more effectively, smoothly and efficiently. It is possible
to mesh federal purposes and accountability with state and local flexibility
without undue friction or burden.
The most thoughtful analysis of the trade-off phenomenon is an essay on
reorganization by Herbert Kauffman in the 1977 Brookings Institution study,
Setting National Priorities: The 1978 Budget. Kauffman's article is a map of
the minefield that federal reorganizers must cross. He warns:
No given administrative pattern will inevitably increase efficiency, effectiveness,
or responsiveness . . . . [Niobody should expect sudden, swift, dramatic
diminishment in the size and cost of the executive branch of the federal
government as a result of reorganization . . . The 1977-78 controversies over
in what promises
government reorganization are only the opening skirmishes
7
to be a long, hard, and frequently futile endeavor.
Reorganization Policy
Beyond my reservations about both mechanistic analogies and insensitivity
to the inevitability of trade-offs, there is a third reason for my apprehension
about the representations made for reorganization. It is that too often reorganizers
omit-some of them perhaps deliberately-an explicit recognition that
reorganization of the executive branch of the government of the United States
is not simply an exercise in improving the efficiency of government.
Reorganization is a fundamentally political act, not political in the partisan
sense (although it may be), but political in that every organization-and every
reorganization-means a distribution-or redistribution-of power and influence
over the substance of policy.
A given table of organization allows some people to be more easily heard
while closing the door on others-and access is power. A given organization
focuses on some approaches to dealing with problems while ignoring others.
A given organization in practice defines the issues the government will address.
Organization is not just management. It is policy, and in the American
democratic system, policy is politics.
7.

Harvey Kauffman, "Reflections on the Administrative Reorganization," in Setting National Priorities:
The 1978 Budget 402, 417-18 (Joseph A. Pechman ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Kauffman].
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THE POLITICS OF REORGANIZATION:
THE VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION AND AGING PROGRAMS
Let me illustrate my point with an example. The education subcommittee
I chair had §ome protracted and bitter battles with the Nixon administration
over the question of where in the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare the vocational rehabilitation program and the Administration on Aging
should be located. In both these cases, the Nixon administration was attempting
to consolidate programs ' to serve handicapped adults and the aging with the
welfare programs in the department. Beneath a surface rationality for these
organizational changes were some crucial policy implications. Both the vocational
rehabilitation and aging programs serve their target groups without regard to
income. Putting these programs in the welfare bureaucracy was a step in the
direction of making eligibility for vocational rehabilitation and services for the
aging subject to a needs or poverty test. If the two became welfare programs,
their potential clientele would be reduced.
For example, only the aging poor rather than all of the aging would have
been served. This organizational change would also have diminished the political
power of the handicapped and the aging, for a program with only poor clients
has much less political influence than one which includes some middle income
constituents. They are the ones who are the most politically active and articulate.
Exclude the middle income group from eligibility and political support for the
programs would correspondingly wane. Then cutbacks in funds for them would
become easier, the basic Nixon objective all along.
To counter these goals of the executive branch, Congress insisted by law
that the vocational rehabilitation and aging programs be kept out of the welfare
bureaucracy, and that their administrators report directly to the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare.
Another dimension of the same story was the Nixon administrations's
attempt to dilute the vocational rehabilitation program under which social
services to handicapped persons are provided through a counselor system. The
administration proposed that these counselors offer services not only to the
handicapped but also to welfare recipients and others. Once again, a plausible
contention that better use be made of an existing and effective delivery system
concealed an effort to slash funds by loading new tasks on the vocational
rehabilitation counselors. The proposed change threatened to swamp them and
the rehabilitation system with new clients, and to produce less rather than
more effective services for everyone.
This struggle between my subcommittee and the executive branch has
several other chapters, including, in our view-and I here note that Republicans
on our subcommittee joined Democrats in this attitude-deliberate attempts
by the executive branch to evade Congressional intent as embodied in laws
that ran contrary to the administration's policy preference.
My point here, I trust, is clear. Members of Congress become deeply
involved in reorganizational issues not because we enjoy drawing up organizational
charts but because reorganizations directly affect the allocation of dollars, the
location of the authority to spend them, and, most important, the purposes
for which money will be spent. These are all questions that involve public
accountability for the use of tax dollars and are, therefore, questions of deep
and legitimate concern to Congress. Congress acts in these instances because
of the clear and substantial policy, that is to say, political, implications of
reorganization.
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One other illustration of the point I am making was the struggle between
Congress and the Nixon administration over its reorganization of the Office
of Economic Opportunity. The issue here was certainly not one of cutting red
tape and improving efficiency but rather the more fundamental question of
whether the War of Poverty should be consigned to an early grave.
In all these cases, again to quote Kauffman, "The calculus of reorganization
is essentially the calculus of policies itself."8
THE POLITICS OF REORGANIZATION:
THE OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Because I have here cited instances of reorganization in which a Democratic
Congress was at odds with a Republican administration, I must make clear
that the willingness of Members of Congress-at least of this one-to criticize
a reorganization effort is not confined to administrations controlled by the
opposite party.
In September, 1977, the select education subcommittee sharply criticized
an Assistant Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare about a.major
reorganization of the Office of Human Development (OHD) which had been
announced in late July.
By way of background, I must explain that at a hearing before our
subcommittee in March, 1977, I had questioned the Assistant Secretary for
Human Development, Ms. Arabella Martinez, about her reorganization plans,
which had not then, she told the subcommittee, been formulated. 9
After I reminded her that the subcommittee had jurisdiction, both legislative
and oversight, over a number of the programs for which she had administrative
responsibility, Ms. Martinez assured the subcommittee10 that "We would be
very pleased to have your involvement in our process."
This response was certainly in keeping with President Carter's pledge of
April 6, 1977, the day he signed the Reorganization Act. Said the President,
"The reorganization process.which is set into motion today will be an open
one. We intend to involve the Congress, State and local governments, and
individual groups and citizens who will be affected by change . . .,,1
On the same day, the White House Press Office released a sheet containing
questions and answers about the President's Reorganization Project.
Here are three of the questions and part of'the answers to them:
Will the Administration's commitments to openness extend to the
Q.
reorganization project?
A. Hopefully, we have learned from the failure of previous reorganization
proposals which were developed in a political vacuum or with only superficial
outside input. A hallmark or our approach will be consultation with the
Congress, affected interest groups, agency personnel, state and local government
officials, and the public.
Q. Is the public going to be able to participate in the development of
reorganization proposals?
8.
9.
10.
11.

Kauffman, supra note 7, at 406.
Proposed Extension of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 142 (1977)
(Statement by Arabella Martinez) [hereinafter Child Abuse Prevention Hearings].
Child Abuse Prevention Hearings, supra note 9, at 142 (Statement by Arabella Martinez).
Statement by the President on Signing S. 626 Into Law, 13 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 493, 494
(Apr. 11, 1977).
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A. Public hearings and a solicitation of views of affected groups will be a
part of the program . . . .
Q. Won't an 'open' reorganization process which involves the Congress and
special interest groups tip your hand and stir up more opposition to your
plans?
A. No. Opposition is most likely when Congress and interest groups are
surprised by plans to which they have not contributed. An open process, by
giving all interests a chance to be heard, should result in greater support in
12
the long run.
The reorganization of the Office of Human Development about which
Assistant Secretary Martinez was asked by our subcommittee to testify embraces
a wide range of federal programs, including services for handicapped children
and adults, child welfare, families, Native Americans, the aging, veterans programs with an estimated annual budget totaling nearly five billion dollars.
Despite the assistant secretary's commitment in March, 1977, and the clear
language of the White House statement, there was no serious effort at all on
the part of the HEW officials responsible for the OHD reorganization to
consult with, in the language of the April 6 White House question and answer
sheet, "Congress, affected interest groups, agency personnel, state and local
government officials, and the public."
A few days before Ms. Martinez appeared before my subcommittee, witness
after witness representing groups of Americans directly affected by the
reorganization of OHD testified to us that they had been given no opportunity
to make any contribution to this effort.
The executive director of a coalition of local, state, and national organizations
of and for disabled persons, having been told upon inquiry that they would
be advised if any reorganization were undertaken, testified that the group next
heard about the reorganization on the day it was announced. 13 A spokesman
for the state welfare administrators observed that not only were they not
consulted about the reorganization but that one and a half months after the
fact they still did not know with whom in the new structure they should now
deal. 14 A witness for the American Foundation for the Blind told the
subcommittee, "There is no question in my mind that we have been confronted
with a fait accompli.' 5 A representative of another client organization
summarized the theme of nearly all the spokesmen of the constituent groups
affected by the OHD reorganization. He wrote, "It seems that administrators
tend to take the view that the organization plan for service delivery rests
within their private domain, where legislators and the public dare not
16
tread."
Aside from expressing their distrust of the reorganization because of the
absence of consultation, the witnesses raised a host of substantive concerns.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

Executive Office of the President, President's Reorganization Project 10, 11 (Apr. 1977).
Reorganization of the Office of Human Development: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977) (Statement
by Frank G. Bowe, Director, American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities Inc.) (hereinafter OHD
Reorganization Hearings].
OHD Reorganization Hearings, supra note 13, at 178, 179 (Statement by Gregory L. Coler, Chairman,
Social Service Committee, National Council of State Public Welfare Administrators, American Public
Welfare Association).
OHD Reorganization Hearings, supra note 13, at 56 (Statement by Irvin P. Schloss, Director,
Govermental Relations, American Foundation for the Blind).
James Gashel, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor (Sep. 8, 1977) (National Federation of the Blind document, at 1) (written statement
submitted to the Subcomm. on Select Education). See also: OHD Reorganization Hearings, supra note
13, at 28, 29 (Statement by James Gashel, Chief, Washington Office, National Federation of the
Blind).
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They questioned the efforts on the priority and independence of various programs
that would result from the new groupings and layering provided for in the
reorganization.
Not a single member of our subcommittee (or the full Committee on
Education and Labor) was consulted on the reorganization, nor, I found on
inquiry, were Senators on our counterpart committee, the Committee on Human
Resources, asked for their opinions.
And in further questioning of some of my senior colleagues on the House
Ways and Means Committee who have legislative and oversight responsibility
for some of the programs in OHD, I discovered that none of them had been
approached by HEW officials for their opinion on the reorganization..
Just as astonishing is that members of the President's OMB Reorganization
Project did not learn of the OHD reorganization until one day before it was
announced.
Our subcommittee meetings, in light of this history, were not pleasant.
Subcommittee members, including the chairman, were vigorously critical of
the OHD reorganization in several ways.
There was obviously indignation, not to say outrage, at the complete failure
of HEW officials to engage in open consultation on the reorganization before
it went into effect.
In view of the fact that the basic reorganization had already been put
into place, subcommittee members were clearly skeptical, indeed, incensed, at
the assistant secretary's pledge after the fact of the reorganization "to work
closely with Members of Congress and their staffs, constituent organizations
and employee unions at every stage of implementation."
Subcommittee members also noted that staff members of the President's
Reorganization Project had been in close touch with our subcommittee concerning
their efforts, and that officials in other divisions of HEW had not feared to
talk with Members of Congress and interested groups. Here I would cite, for
example, both the Commissioner of Education and the Director of the National
Institute of Education.
Subcommittee members raised other questions about the OHD reorganization
which, like the reorganization itself, have important relevance to efforts to
reorganize the rest of the executive branch.
We wanted to know-and still do-if the reorganization will result in
thinnning personnel responsible for the delivery of services in order to fatten
the assistant secretary's administrative staff.
We were all struck by the lack of awareness by the assistant secretary of
the history of Congressional concern about the effects of reorganization on
policy in her area of responsibility.
There are, it seems to me, two lessons here. First, there ought always to
be, by way of justification for a reorganization, some hard-headed evidence
and analysis that suggest that the change will on balance produce improved
services to people and/or savings in cost. Simple assertions that these results
will follow a modification of the table of organization just will not do.
Congress was given no such justification for the reorganization of OHD.
Instead, we were told that "THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION IS UNMANAGEABLE," as if that declarative statement and the fact that it was all in
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17
capital letters and underlined were enough to prove the case.
The second lesson to be derived from the assistant secretary's inability to
give a rationale for reorganization in terms of its impact on policy is the one
I made earlier, namely, that every organization-and every reorganization-means
a distribution-or redistribution-of power and influence over the substance
of policy.
We also wanted to know-and still do-why HEW officals engaged in
reorganization of OHD were not coordinating their efforts with those persons
in the President's Reorganization Project who are charged with similar
responsibilities.
Now I cite this particular example of reorganization for several reasons.
It touches on an area with which I have some familiarity. It illustrates problems
and pitfalls in executive reorganization that run across the entire spectrum of
the federal executive. It is, indeed, a classic case of how not to reorganize.
And above all, it demonstrates the validity of the proposition that, as
Kauffman said, "The calculus of reorganization is the calculus of politics
itself."

QUESTIONS TO ASK CONCERNING REORGANIZATION
Here then are some questions that I believe are at least among those that
should be directed to every proposed reorganization:
What are the policies that will be affected by the reorganization and how
will they be affected?
For example, will the plan be likely to result in more effective delivery of
services to the clientele? Will money be saved without dimunition in services?
And where are the hard evidence and analysis to substantiate the change?
No one can object to making the bureaucracy tidier or the life of
administrators easier so long as reaching these goals does not subvert the
purposes of the programs they administer.
Another question: What are the trade-offs in a proposed reorganization?
For example, is location at a higher level in the bureaucracy to be the
price paid for less adequate funding of the program?
Still another question: Has the proposed reorganization been subjected to
the consideration and questioning of Congress, state and local officials and
others affected by the change?
Or has consulation been so lacking or so cosmetic as, despite the genuine
merits of the reorganization, to arouse such suspicion and hospitality that the
plan is crippled?
THE IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION
ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The kinds of questions I have been raising as a Member of Congress are,
in my view, the same kinds of questions that state and local officials should
ask in assessing the impact on their activities of a proposed reorganization.
17.

U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Fact Sheet on OHD Reorganization 14
(Exhibit 2) (Jul. 26, 1977), reprinted in OHD Reorganization Hearings, supra note 13, at 97
(attachment to Statement by Arabella Martinez, Assistant Secretary for Human Development Services,
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare).
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If my analysis is not too far off the mark, it seems clear that reorganization
will affect the capacity of state and local officials to get a hearing, to voice
their concerns, to have access.
/
Because funds will flow though the channels established by reorganization,
these officials must ask if these channels will move the money in different
directions and ones important to states and localities.
In turn, the ways in which state and local government organize themselves
can be significantly affected by changes in the organization of the federal
executive. There will usually be a pull toward parralleling the new federal
organization in order to be able effectively to take advantage of the federal
programs.
It should be noted that legislation that follows a federal reorganization
often provides incentives or in some cases a mandate that states and cities
develop organizational structures compatible with the federal organization and
the policies it reflects.
For example, the Rehabilitation Act of 197318 required as a condition for
receiving fedeial money for vocational rehabilitation of handicapped persons
that each state administer with clear lines of accountability the federally funded
vocational rehabilitation programs. Congress was concerned that money intended
for services to the handicapped be spent for that purpose and not for some
other. One state, for instance, ignored the law, insisted on a different
organizational arrangement and is now facing the loss of millions of dollars.
In this connection, I might note that the Auditor General of that state recently
issued a report which concluded that the administrative structure chosen by
state officials produced waste, a loss of effective managerial and fiscal control
and lower quality services to handicapped persons.
CONCLUSIONS:
IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF REORGANIZATION
The process of reorganizing the federal government would be greatly
improved if it were to become more openly and explicitly political, not in a
partisan sense but in the simple acknowledgment that organization involves
policy.
It is for precisely this reason, that reorganization usually involves substantive
policy, that there can be no simple prescriptions for an appropriate organization.
Decisions about reorganization often mean decisions about competing goods
rather than discovering the one right answer. The preferred reorganization
may therefore depend largely on one's judgment about preferred policy and
in turn that judgment, understandably, will be significantly affected by where
one sits. A President, OMB Director, Cabinet Secretary, Senator or Congressman,
governor or state legislator, mayor or school board member are likely to have
very different perceptions of the policy impact of a particular reorganization.
The answer to the question of whether any reorganization is good from a
policy perspective is again: "It All Depends."
What does this conclusion mean in terms of the impact of federal
reorganization on state and local governments?
It means that in evolving reorganization proposals, the federal executive
must be open: open to the realization that reorganization means policy, and
18.

87 Stat. 355, codified at 29 U.S.C. §701 et seq.
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open therefore to honest consultation with Members of Congress, interested
groups, state and local officials and others affected by the proposed change.
Reorganizers should, therefore, abandon the view that, for example,
Congressional concern with reorganization is tiresome meddling with matters
that are none of Congress' business.
Even as the federal executive must do much better in consulting Congress
and the interest groups, reorganizers must be more sensitive to hearing the
views of state and local officials.
And I believe that this exhortation applies equally to us in Congress
whenever we consider legislation that affects state and local units of government
and other institutions in society.
More specifically on this point, I believe that we in Congress should engage
in more oversight hearings such as the ones my subcommittee held on the
Section 504 regulations under the Rehabilitation Act 19 and
on
the
implementation of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. 20
I think that within. the limits of our time and resources, Congressional
committees should hold more hearings across the country, outside Washington,
D.C., at which state and local leaders can voice their concerns and offer their
recommendations.
More broadly, I believe that both Congress and the federal executive should
work more closely with organizations of governors, state legislators, school
superintendents and teachers and parents, to cite only a few, in the continuing
effort to build bridges for an on-going dialogue between and among the several
partners in the federal system.
Reorganization of the executive branch of the federal government must be
viewed in the context of the American constitutional and political system.
Because of the many variables involved, predicting the impact of reorganization
will not be easy.
Although traditionally discussed in terms of improving the performance of
government, reorganization is not an exact science and often involves trade-offs
among competing goals.
Above all, it must be understood that reorganization affects the distribution
of power and influence over policy. For reorganization to be effective, therefore,
at least in a democratic society, there must be open acknowledgement of this
truism and a corresponding commitment to genuine involvement of the affected
parties in the process that produces the change.
For reorganization of government, like government itself, should have as
its principal purpose the service of the citizenry.

19.
20.

Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor on Implementation of Section 504, Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. (Sep.
9, 13 and 16, 1977).
Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor on the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sep. 26-27,
1977).

